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 1 Introduction
I am very grateful for this opportunity to talk to you today aboutMoral Fictionalism.
The epigram of that book was the following quotation from Kant:
One cannot give too many or too frequent warnings against this laxity,
or even mean cast of mind, which seeks its principle among empirical
motives and laws; for, human reason in its weariness gladly rests on this
pillow and in a dream of sweet illusions (which allow it to embrace a
cloud instead of Juno) it substitutes for a morality a bastard patched
up from limbs of quite diverse ancestry, which looks like whatever one
wants to see in it but not like virtue for him who has once seen virtue in
her true form.
One of my aims today is to make plain the signicance of this passage .
I was initially prompted to writeMoral Fictionalism by my dissatisfaction with the
state of public moral discourse as it was in the United States just prior to Bush's
initial election. The country was remarkably divided, though these divisions were
subsequently obscured by the national grief and outrage following 9/11. I say these
divisions were obscured, not obliterated, for they have subsequently reemerged.
These divisions had, to my mind, a disastrous eect on public moral discourse
both in its content and how it was conducted. I was particularly alarmed given the
important role public moral discourse plays, not only in civil society, but in modern
democratic societies such as the United States. It is an unquestionable prerequisite
for the ourishing of a liberal democracy that a frank and respectful moral exchange
∗Thanks, as ever, to Véronique MunozDardé for her thoughtful and patient discussion of these
and related matters.
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be possible among its citizenseven among those who disagree about fundamental
matters. All the more so given the challenges presently facing liberal democracy
throughout the world (both from without and within).
Let me begin with, what I hope is, a fairly uncontroversial example of an obstacle
to reasonable moral discussion. The obstacle is not necessarily the most important,
but it is a real obstacle whose force is easy to appreciate if only in our calmer and
more reective moments.
A familiar, if disquieting, feature of public moral disagreement is the tendency
to assume, without evidence, that the judgment of one's disputant is subject to
a debunking explanation. A debunking explanation is an explanation for a person's
judgment in terms unconnected with reasons for accepting that judgment. So, for
example, one might explain a person's opposition to a policy of equitable redistri
bution, not in terms of reasons relevant to determining what justice requires, but,
rather, in terms of self or classinterest. Let me make a couple of comments to
clarify. First, despite the nature of the example, I do not mean to suggest that
debunking explanations are the sole provence of the Left. The Right oers debunk
ing explanations as well. Thus, at least in the United States, it has been claimed
that certain environmentalists are motivated less by the value and requirements
of stewardship, if such a thing is indeed of value and a source of requirements,
than by the classinterests of middle class homeowners who reasonably believe that
property prices will fall with the erosion of the green belt. Second, my objection
has less to do with debunking explanations per se, than with advancing debunking
explanations on the basis of no evidence, from the mere fact of disagreement. After
all, debunking explanations have a distinguished history, having been advanced by
Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, Foucault . . . and Hume!at least with respect to the mo
tives of clerics and other religious enthusiasts. Moreover, a debunking explanation
of the judgments we make may in fact be true, if the evidence is adequate. What is
objectionable is the tendency to oer a debunking explanation of one's disputant's
judgment, without evidence, solely on the basis of disagreement. For if you accept
that explanation, you cut yourself o from whatever reasons they may have for their
diering moral judgement. Debunking explanations mark the end of discussion and
not the beginning of mutual understanding and respect.
Today, I will talk about, not debunking explanations, but a dierent, if related,
obstacle to reasonablemoral discussion, one that threatens not just reasonablemoral
discussion, but its very cognitive aspirations. What I mean by this last remark will
be clear as I proceed.
 2 Intransigence
The obstacle to reasonable moral discussion that was at the heart of the argument
of Moral Fictionalism was what I called intransigence. To get a sense of moral in
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transigence, consider Hilary Putnam's admirable description of the deep political
disagreement between Robert Nozick and himself:
But what of the fundamentals on which one cannot agree? It would
be dishonest to pretend that one thinks that there are no better and
worse views here. I don't think that it is just a matter of taste whether
one thinks that the obligation of the community to treat its members
with compassion takes precedence over property rights; nor does my
codisputant. Each of us regards the other as lacking, at this level, a
certain kind of sensitivity and perception. To be perfectly honest, there
is in each of us something akin to contempt, not for the other's mind
for we each have the highest regard for each other's mindsnor for the
other as a person, for I have more respect for my colleague's honesty,
integrity, kindness, etc., than I do for that of many people who agree
with my `liberal' political viewsbut for a certain complex of emotions
and judgments in the other. (Putnam, 1981, p. 165)
Putnam should be commended for his candor here. What Putnam holds in some
thing akin to contempt is Nozick's moral sensibility (`a certain complex of emotions
and judgments in the other')amoral sensibility that privileges property rights over
what Putnam regards as the compassionate treatment of the less well o.
Putnam is right at least to this extentjudgments about what justice require are
unlike judgments of taste. Taste is, of course, a source of reasons. If I have a taste for
the music of Eliot Carter, that is a reason for me to listen to suchmusic. But reasons
of taste dier importantly from moral reasons. Reasons of taste are contingent
upon one's having that taste. If I lacked a taste for Carter's brand of modernist
music I would lack a reason to listen to it. But moral reasons are not contingent
in this way. Moral reasons are reasons for us whether or not we judge them to be
reasons. So Putnam is right in emphasizing the dierence. However, this makes
Putnam's reaction all the more puzzling. By Putnam's own admission, Nozick is
a reasonable and informed person who is interested in determining what justice
requires. Moreover, Nozick takes himself to know, or at least be reasonable certain,
what justice requires. Moreover, he takes himself to know, or be reasonably certain,
what justice requires on the basis of reasonsindeed the reasons he developed
over the course of his book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. If Nozick's reasons are
genuine, then they would undermine Putnam's own judgment about what justice
requiresfor unlike reasons of taste, they would apply to Putnam whether or not
Putnam judges that they apply. Normally, if only about less heated matters, when
a reasonable and informed person, interested in determining the truth about some
matter, disagrees with you on a reasoned basis, and so possesses reasons which, if
genuine, would undermine your own judgment, then there is a natural tendency to
reconsider the matter. After all, your disputant may be onto something that you
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have so far overlooked. But if Putnam holds Nozick's moral sensibility in something
akin to contempt, what motivation would Nozick's accepting undermining reasons
provide Putnam for reconsidering his moral judgment? None. Thus, the reaction
that Putnam carefully describes is a manifestation of moral intransigence. It is a
kind of intransigence since it is an unwillingness to reconsider his moral judgment
in the light of reasoned disagreement.
I will return to why I think this motive to reconsider is a fundamental component
of reasonable moral discussion and its cognitive aspirations. But for now, let's
consider what evidence there might be for thinking that public moral discourse is
intransigent in this way.
There is, of course, the anecdata (or anecdottage depending on your credulousness
or skepticism about the signicance of anecdote) provided by the Putnam quote.
But even if it provides some evidence, what evidence it would provide would be
extremely weaka single instance of intransigence in a discourse of whom every
human being is a participant.
What would be better would be systematic empirical evidence about the actual
extent of moral intransigence. Unfortunately, that would require a sensitive inter
pretation of a moral sociology that has yet to be written. I am a philosopher, not a
sociologist, so I am unlikely to produce the relevant moral sociology, nor would it
likely be reliable should I undertake such an endeavor.
Fortunately, there is a kind of evidence available to me as a philosopher, not so
much about the extent of moral intransigence, but, more importantly, about the
intelligibility of intransigence given the norms that govern public moral discourse.
Indeed I believe that the intelligibility of moral intransigence might be established
by thoughtexperiment. How might a thoughtexperiment establish a claim about
the norms that actually govern moral discourse? That's a good question. Hopefully
the following is a good answer, at least to a rst approximation.
There is no such thing as moral science ction. While we may be able to imagine
societies with moral codes dierent from our own, we cannot imagine morality
requiring something other thanwhat we know it to require. We can imagine people's
moral judgments diering systematically from our own, but we cannot coherently
imagine the moral facts diering systematically. Moral norms constrain what we can
intelligibly imagine. That's why there is no such thing as moral science ction. It
is just not possible to vary the moral norms that we accept in imagination the way
that writers of science ction can vary the facts in the tales they tell. So if we can
conceive of cases where such intransigence is intelligible, then it must be so at least
by the norms govern moral discourse that we actually accept and tacitly appeal to
in so conceiving.
Consider, then, the following thoughtexperiment and what it might reveal about
the norms that actually govern public moral discourse. Edgar and Bernice disagree
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about the moral status of abortion. Whereas Bernice accepts the wrongness of
abortion, Edgar is a complacent liberal moralist and accepts that abortion is permis
sible. Edgar reasons as follows (Edgar and Bernice's arguments are quoted verbatim
from MacIntyre's book After Virtue):
Everyone has a right over their own person and their own body. Given
the nature of these rights, when an embryo is essentially part of the
mother's body, the mother has the right to make her own uncoerced de
cision on whether she will have an abortion or not. Therefore, abortion
is morally permissible. (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 67)
So Edgar, implicitly at least, accepts a principle that counts a certain feature of the
circumstance, the embryo being essentially part of the mother's body, as a reason
to accept the permissibility of abortion. Bernice, however, rejects this principle.
Bernice reasons instead as follows:
I cannot will that my mother should have had an abortion when she was
pregnant with me, except perhaps if it had been certain that the embryo
was dead or gravely damaged. But if I cannot will this in my own case,
how can I consistently deny to others the right to life I claim for myself?
I would break the socalled Golden Rule unless I denied that a mother
has in general a right to an abortion. (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 67)
In uttering A`bortion is permissible' Edgar demands, implicitly at least, that his
audience accept that sentence. So Edgar must accept that sentence on behalf of
others if his utterance is sincere. Indeed, Edgar is sincere. He accepts A`bortion is
permissible' on behalf of others for he takes himself to have access to reason that
is a reason to accept that claim not only for himself, but for everyone else as well.
This is a mark of the authority of morality. Hume puts the point this way:
When a man denominates another his enemy, his rival, his antagonist,
his adversary, he is understood to speak the language of selflove, and to
express sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular
circumstances and situation. But when he bestows on any man the epi
thets of vicious or odious or depraved, he then speaks another language,
and expresses sentiments, in which, he expects, all his audience are to
concur with him. He must here, therefore, depart from his private and
particular situation, and must chuse a point of view, common to him and
others. (Hume, 1740/2003, 9)
Bernice, likeEdgar, ismotivated to accept onbehalf of others a claim about themoral
status of abortion. Supposing that she is an intelligent and articulate spokesperson,
Bernice might strike Edgar as an otherwise reasonable, informed human being who
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coherently accepts a reason that, if genuine, would undermine his acceptance of the
permissibility of abortion. Nevertheless, Edgar feels no embarrassment about this.
His persistence in his liberal morality is uninching. Edgar is intransigent in the
sense that he lacks a motivation to reconsider his moral judgment no matter how
tentatively. Nor is Edgar alone in this. I suspect that we too would be unmoved by
such a disagreement. Our own persistence in liberal morality would be uninching
as well. We too would be intransigent in the sense of lacking a motivation to inquire
further into the grounds of moral judgment. In normal circumstances, we are under
no obligation to reexamine the foundations of moral claims that we accept as
unproblematic even if they are disputed by otherwise reasonable, informed, and
interested people who coherently accept reasons that, if genuine, would undermine
them.
Again, I am not making an empirical claim about the actual extent of moral
intransigence; rather, I ammaking a conceptual claim about the norms that actually
govern moral discourse. Given the norms that we actually accept, it is intelligible
to fail to be motivated to inquire further. If we can conceive of cases where such
intransigence is intelligible, then it must be so at least by the norms governing
moral discourse that we actually accept and tacitly appeal to in so conceiving. Not
only is it intelligible that one, as a matter of fact, takes no positive steps towards
reexamining the grounds of moral judgmentafter all, one might reasonably have
more pressing immediate concerns; but it is intelligible as well that one should lack
this motivation altogether. And if the failure to adopt the end of further inquiry is
intelligible, then we are under no rational obligation to adopt this end, at least by
the norms of moral discourse that we actually, if implicitly, accept.
Let's now consider, whymoral intransigence poses a problem for reasonablemoral
discussion, a problem that potentially undermines the cognitive aspirations of public
moral discourse.
 3 Noncomplacency and Cognition
First, what do I mean by the cognitive aspirations of moral discourse? To say of a
given region of discourse that it has cognitive aspirations is to make a claim about
the linguistic actions performed by uttering sentences of that discourse and the
attitudes involved in accepting the claims of that discourse.
If a region of discourse is cognitive, then the utterance of a sentence from that
discourse performs a certain kind of action. Specically, to utter a sentence of a
cognitive discourse is to make an assertion. Historical discourse is typically taken to
be assertoric. So if I utter the sentence `Locke, alongwithHalifax and IsaacNewton,
presided over great recoinage of 1694' I have asserted that claim, an assertion that
can be evaluated as true or false, depending, of course, upon the historical facts.
Moreover, if I am sincere, then my assertion that Locke presided over the `great
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recoinage' expresses my belief that he did. In general, sincere assertions express the
beliefs of the speaker, because in accepting the claim that I assert I believe it. That's
what it means to describe a discourse as cognitivethe linguistic action performed
by uttering a sentence of that discourse is assertion and the attitude involved in
accepting the asserted claim is belief.
In order for a region of discourse to live up to its cognitive aspirations it must
be disciplined in a certain wayit must be subject to the appropriate norms if it
is to articulate our beliefs about the given subject matter. The problem posed by
moral intransigencea problem that threatens the cognitive aspirations of moral
discourseis that intransigence is inconsistent with a norm necessary for moral
discourse to be genuinely cognitive. Or so I contend.
To bring the relevant norm into focus, I want to rst consider a particular kind
of disagreement, and then consider what the rational response to this kind of
disagreement would be if the relevant discourse is genuinely cognitive.
Suppose that Edgar and Bernice disagree about some claim, S. While Edgar
accepts S, Bernice rejects S. Though she rejects S, Bernice strikes Edgar as an
otherwise reasonable human being. The mere fact of disagreement need not bother
Edgar, for he might plausibly think that their disagreement derives from Bernice's
ignorance of the relevant evidence. Suppose, however, that Edgar engages Bernice
in discussion and rules out this possibility: Edgar and Bernice share a common
body of evidence. Not only is Bernice fully informed about the evidence that Edgar
accepts, but she is also internally coherent in taking that evidence as a reason for
rejecting Sjust as Edgar is internally coherent in taking that evidence as a reason
for accepting S. While they share a common body of evidence, they nonetheless
disagree about its epistemic signicance and are internally coherent in doing so. So
both are otherwise reasonable, informed, and can oer what the other would regard
as a questionbegging argument for their acceptance or rejection of the target claim.
Edgar and Bernice's positions conict: they disagree about whether to accept or
reject S. However, if we focus solely on the fact of conict, we will miss something
important about their disagreement. For Edgar and Bernice disagree not only about
which claim to accept in the given circumstance, they apparently disagree aboutwhat
would count as a reason for accepting that claim in the given circumstance. Since
Edgar and Bernice disagree not only about S but also what would count as a reason
for accepting or rejecting S, their disagreement is a disagreement about reasons.
To get a better sense of this, let's consider a few quick examples. So, for ex
ample, otherwise reasonable palaeontologists can agree about the fossil record and
yet disagree about what that record establishes. If they do, they are engaged in a
disagreement about reasons: each implicitly accepts distinct principles that count
potentially distinct aspects of the fossil record as reasons for the acceptance or
rejection of the target claim. Similarly, constructivists and classical mathematicians
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disagree about what counts as a reason for accepting a mathematical sentence. Con
structivists maintain that the reasons for accepting a mathematical claim could only
take the form of a constructive proof whereas classical mathematicians allow that
nonconstructive proof procedures also provide reasons for accepting mathematical
claims. Not only are methodological disputes in the special sciences disagreements
about reasons, but so are disagreements that result from dierent styles of in
ductive reasoning. Some of us are hasty inductive reasoners and some are more
conservativesome accept generalizations on the basis of fewer observations than
others. Disagreements about reasons may be theoretical, but they can be practical
as well. Thus, Thomas Scanlon writes:
[Disagreement about reasons] is surely possible and perhaps even com
mon. I think that it is plausible to suggest that we have an example of it
in the contemporary disagreement between secular liberals like me, who
see nothing morally objectionable about homosexuality, and conserva
tive Christians who believe that it is a serious wrong. (Scanlon, 1998, p.
xx)
What is the rational response to a disagreement about reasons?
If we conne ourselves to what can be described in terms of rational permissibility,
then not only is it rationally permissible for Edgar to persist in his acceptance of
S, but it is also rationally permissible for Edgar to reviseto reject or suspend
judgment concerning S.
Edgar's persistence in his acceptance of S might be rationally permissible on a
number of grounds. Suppose belief is conservative in the sense that we accept the
policy of persisting in our beliefs unless presented with a positive reason to change
our minds. Since the evidence's having a dierent normative appearance for Bernice
is not a positive reason for Edgar to change his mind, if conservativism is a genuine
epistemic norm, then it is rationally permissible for Edgar to persist in his belief
that S. Conservativism is not the only grounds for the rational permissibility of
persistence. Suppose, owing to some psychological necessity, Edgar simply cannot
give up his acceptance of S. Since he must accept S, and is not selfcontradictory or
otherwise internally incoherent in so doing, it might be rationally permissible for
him to persist in his acceptance of S. Just as it is rationally permissible for Edgar to
persist in his acceptance of S, it is rationally permissible for him to reviseto reject
or suspend judgment concerning S.
Revisionmight be rationally permissible on a number of grounds. So, for example,
it might be rationally permissible for Edgar to revise if, upon reection, he came to
accept a debunking explanation for the disagreement between himself and Bernice,
that is, if he came to explain their disagreement in terms accidentally connected
to reasons for acceptance. Coming to accept a debunking explanation is not the
only grounds for the rational permissibility of revision. Suppose that Edgar came
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to believe that there is a perfect symmetry between his epistemic position and
Bernice's. Edgar could not coherently be a cognitivist and persist in accepting S,
and in accepting that Bernice is wrong in rejecting S, while maintaining that they
are in equally good positions to know whether or not that S. If reection on the
disagreement about reasons prompts Edgar to accept a debunking explanation of
their disagreement, or to accept that there is a perfect epistemic symmetry between
himself and Bernice, then it would be rationally permissible for Edgar to reviseto
reject or suspend judgment concerning S.
If we conne ourselves to what can be described in terms of rational permissibility,
then it would seem that persistence and revision are both rationally permissible.
However, there is an important aspect of the rational response to a disagreement
about reasons that has so far been left out of account. While, in the context of a
disagreement about reasons, persistence and revision are both rationally permissible,
sometimes at least, if acceptance is cognitive, there is something epistemically
admirable about at least considering revising. After all, retaining belief on the
grounds of conservativism, psychological necessity, and the like can seem like a
reluctant capitulation to epistemic necessity. At any rate, acquiescing on such
grounds is hardly a cognitive achievement. In contrast, a decision to reconsider
manifests a responsiveness to reasons that is itself manifestly reasonable. Upon
determining that his disagreement with Bernice is, at bottom, a disagreement about
reasons, Edgar might be motivated to reexamine his reasons for accepting S. Edgar
might inquire further into the grounds of his acceptance to determine whether, in
light of his discussion with Bernice, his reasons for acceptance are good reasons.
He might also inquire further to determine, in light of his discussion with Bernice,
what, if anything, there is to Bernice's reasons for rejection. After all, Bernice might
be onto something that so far eludes Edgar. While Edgar is not rationally required
to inquire further into the grounds of acceptance, in the sense that his failure to do
so would not be epistemically blameworthy, there would be something epistemically
admirable about his inquiring further. There is something cognitively virtuous about
being motivated to inquire further into the grounds of acceptance in the face of a
disagreement about reasons. If that is right, then there is a normative aspect of
belief that is not describable in deontic vocabulary. Belief involves a cognitive virtue
not describable in terms of rational permissibility.
InMoral Fictionalism, I suggested that this cognitive virtue can be understood as a
rational obligation, not to adopt a given belief, but to adopt and end in determining
what to believean end internal to inquiry. What end could this be? Upon
determining that his disagreement with Bernice is, at bottom, a disagreement about
reasons, Edgar is under a rational obligation to inquire further into the grounds of
acceptance. More precisely, given that he is interested in the truth of S, Edgar, in the
context of a disagreement about reasons, has a reason to reexamine his reasons for
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accepting S, at least if his disputant is otherwise reasonable, informed, and similarly
interested in inquiring about S.
Let me explain. Even in the context of a disagreement about reasons, whether
a person has a reason to inquire further depends on his interest in the truth of S.
After all, `The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth' has never been
a reasonable norm of inquiry. Absent some special interest, there is no reason to
know whether Genghis Khan ever suered from a hangnail, say. However, given
his interest in the truth of S, in the context of a disagreement about reasons, Edgar
would have a motive to inquire further into the grounds of acceptanceor, at
least, he would be so motivated if Bernice were otherwise reasonable, informed,
and similarly interested in inquiring about S. Obviously, Edgar would lack this
motive if Bernice were unreasonable, or ignorant, or weremoved by ulterior motives
unconnected with reasons for acceptance. But if she is none of these, Edgar would
have a motive to inquire further into his grounds for acceptance to determine
whether, in light of his discussion with Bernice, his reasons for acceptance are good
reasons. Edgar would also have a motive to inquire further to determine, in light
of his discussion with Bernice, what, if anything, there is to Bernice's reasons for
rejection. After all, Bernice might be onto something that so far eludes Edgar. To
inquire further is to strive to be responsive to what reasons there are. This would
involve seriously considering the alternatives and so questioning the evidential status
of initial appearances. While persistence is rationally permissible, Edgar must be
prepared to bracket his full acceptance of S when reexamining his reasons for
acceptance. Of course, there is latitude in the fulllment of this end. Further
inquiry is one end among many, and a person's ends must be rationally ordered
perhaps Edgar has more compelling immediate concerns. If, however, Edgar were
to fulll this end, he might satisfy himself with his acceptance of S, or he might
suspend judgment concerning S, or might even reject S. Whatever the outcome,
Edgar's noncomplacency in inquiring further would be epistemically admirable.
Moreover, a failure to act towards the fulllment of this end, to become responsive
to what reasons there are, would merely lack epistemic merit and would be neither
an instance of irrationality nor in any way epistemically blameworthy. Striving to be
responsive to what reasons there are is, in this sense, a manifestation of cognitive
virtue.
 4 Moral Fictionalism
Thanks for your patience in persisting through this detour through some fairly
abstract epistemology. We are now in a position to see how moral intransigence
threatens the cognitive status of moral discourse.
Suppose, then, that noncomplacency is a genuine norm of cognitive discourse.
Specically, suppose that if a region of discourse is cognitive, then when faced with
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a disagreement about reasons with an interlocutor who is reasonable, informed, and
interested in determining the truth of the matter, one is rationally required to adopt
the end of further inquiry. The problem is that noncomplacency is straightforwardly
inconsistent with intransigence. For moral acceptance to be intransigent is for it
to be intelligible to lack this motive altogetherto be unmoved to inquire further
into the grounds of acceptance. Not only would it intelligible that one, as a matter
of fact, take no positive steps towards reexamining the grounds of moral judgment;
but it would be intelligible as well that one should lack this motivation altogether.
And if the failure to adopt the end of further inquiry is intelligible, then we are under
no rational obligation to adopt this end, at least by the norms of moral discourse
that we actually, if implicitly, accept. But if noncomplacency is a necessary condition
for a discourse to be cognitive, then moral discourse fails to be. If intransigence is
intelligible given the norms that actually govern moral discourse, then the cognitive
aspirations of moral discourse are necessarily frustrated.
If moral discourse is noncognitive, then what are we doing when we accept a
moral claim? Moral judgment could not be belief, for it lacks a cognitive virtue
partly constitutive of belief. So what are we doing when we make moral judgments
if not registering our beliefs about what morality requires?
Themoral judgments wemake, if they are not genuine beliefs about whatmorality
requires, can seem more like the expression of our nonmoral concerns. Far from
articulating the impartial demands of morality, our moral judgments would be a
selfportrait of our partial concerns, the emotional attitudes we bear to ourselves
and to others. These concerns may be abiding and important, but they would also
be peculiar to ourselves, at least potentially.
This is the situation that MacIntyre (1981, ch. 2) describes the Bloomsbury group
as being in in accepting Moore's moral philosophy. According to MacIntyre, there
was a radical discrepancy between meaning and use in the moral discourse of the
Bloomsbury group. Given the meaning of moral vocabulary, the acceptance of a
moral sentence seemed to involve the acceptance of a reason with the requisite
authority. However, given the use of moral vocabulary, the acceptance of a moral
sentence actually involved the acceptance of a nonmoral reason that lacked this
authority. Specically, their acceptance of a moral claim was not governed by norms
appropriate to believing that claim; rather, their acceptance of a moral claim was
governed by their desires.
According to Moore (1903), moral properties are nonnatural properties that can
be intuited by persons with the appropriate moral sensibilities. Not only wasMoore
a nonnaturalist and intuitionist, but he was a consequentialist as well: An action is
right in a given circumstances just in case it produces more good consequences than
any alternative action that is open in that circumstance. Moreover, Moore held a
specic conception of the good: Those things that instantiate nonnatural goodness
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to the greatest degree are personal intercourse and the beautiful.
According to MacIntyre, the Bloomsbury group embraced Moore's moral philos
ophy not on the strength of Moore's arguments, but rather because Moore's moral
philosophy reected the values they antecedently accepted. Their preferred form
of life privileged the values of personal intercourse and the beautiful, just as Moore
prescribed. Not only did the Bloomsbury group share Moore's conception of the
good, but they were also disposed towards consequentialist forms of moral reason
ing. Keynes reports that discussions of value involved the explicit ranking of states
of aairs. He cites the following questions put forward for discussion:
If A was in love with B and believed that B reciprocated his feelings,
whereas in factB did not, but was in love with C, the state of aairs was
certainly not as good as it would have been if A had been right, but was
it worse or better than it would become if A discovered his mistake?
If A was in love with B under a misapprehension as to B's qualities, was
this better or worse than A's not being in love at all? (MacIntyre, 1981,
pp. 167)
Moreover, such questions were resolved by appeal to intuition. The Bloomsbury
group would focus on the target state of aairs and attempt to discern as best they
could the presence and degree of nonnatural goodness instantiated in the target
state of aairs. If there was disagreement, then the disputants were either focusing
on dierent subject matters or the moral sensibility of one was better placed to
discern the presence and degree of nonnatural goodness than the other.
So it would seem that the moral practice of the Bloomsbury group was thus
explicitly intuitionistat least on the surface:
But, of course, as Keynes tells us, what was really happening was some
thing quite other: `In practice, victory was with those who could speak
with the greatest appearance of clear, undoubting conviction and could
best use the accents of infallibility' and Keynes goes on to describe the
eectiveness of Moore's gasps of incredulity and headshaking, or Stra
chey's grim silences and Lowes Dickenson's shrugs. (MacIntyre, 1981, p.
17)
IfKeynes is to be believed, this is plainly the kind ofmanipulative noncognitivism for
which Moore's student, Stevenson, has been criticized. On this view, the Blooms
bury group, in accepting an attribution of goodness, was not in fact tracking the
presence and degree of nonnatural goodness. Rather they were engaged in an unwit
ting pretense in which things have, in addition to their natural properties, certain
nonnatural properties that supervene on them and that can be intuited by persons
with the appropriate moral sensibilities.
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Suppose that Edgar was a minor member of the Bloomsbury group. Being a
faithful student of the Principia, Edgar understands the sentence:
A's being in love with B under a misapprehension of B's qualities would
be a better state of aairs than A's never being in love.
as Moore doesas representing a dierence in the degree of nonnatural goodness
instantiated by two potential states of aairs. Moreover, Edgar accepts this sen
tence. In what does Edgar's acceptance of this sentence consist? From within,
Edgar's coming to accept this sentence occurred just as Moore describes: Edgar
contemplates A's being in love under a misapprehension and A's never being in
love and intuits that the former state of aairs instantiates nonnatural goodness
to a degree greater than the latter. However, Edgar's intuition can be explained
independently of the actual intuition of any nonnatural properties. Edgar accepts
that A's being in love under a misapprehension is better that A's never being in love
because, given his sensibility, Edgar approves of the former state of aairs more than
he does the latter.
So there were two complementary principles governing this pretense. First,
Moore's Principia, regardless of the truth of its doctrines, functioned as the mas
ter ction of the moral pretense. In accepting and uttering moral sentences the
Bloomsbury group were acting as if the Principia doctrines correctly described the
moral facts. If we conne our attention to attributions of nonnatural goodness, a
rough statement of one principle governing the moral ction would be:
It is ctionally true that x instantiates nonnatural goodness i according
to the Principia, x instantiates nonnatural goodness.
Not only did the Principia prescribe, at least in general outline, which attributions of
nonnatural goodness were ctionally true, it also prescribed an independent proce
dure for determining which individual attributions were ctionally true. According
to the Principia, attributions of nonnatural goodness are accepted on the basis of
intuition. What makes it ctionally true that a person is intuiting instances of
nonnatural goodness is that, given their sensibility (a sensibility shaped by Moorean
doctrine), they approve of that thing. Within the moral ction, while nonnatural
properties are distinct from natural properties, they nevertheless, supervene on
them. If a thing instantiates the (ctionally subvenient) natural properties thus
endowing it with the tendency to elicit approval from persons with the appropriate
sensibility, then it is ctionally true that it instantiates nonnatural goodness:
It is ctionally true that x instantiates nonnatural goodness i x instanti
ates natural properties that would elicit the relevant emotional attitude
in a person with the appropriate sensibility.
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Putting these principles together we get a principle connecting the emotional atti
tudes of the Bloomsbury group with the content of the Principia:
x instantiates natural properties that would elicit the relevant emotional
attitude in a person with the appropriate sensibility i according to the
Principia, x instantiates nonnatural goodness
In this way, the Principia both controlled and gave expression to the emotional
attitudes of the Bloomsbury group.
Butwhydid theBloomsbury group express their amorous and aesthetic ends in the
language of morality? Why this masquerade? MacIntyre suggests that in rejecting
the moral culture of the late nineteenth century in favor of a form of life that
privileged the values of personal intercourse and the beautiful, what the Bloomsbury
group lacked was a means justifying their preferences to others. Given the practical
conict betweenVictorianmorality and their preferred formof life, the Bloomsbury
group needed a means of rejecting at least those claims of Victorian morality that
were incompatible with their ends. In order to justify their rejection of Victorian
morality and so pursue their preferred form of life, the Bloomsbury group needed
to endow their ends with the authority of morality. Moore's moral philosophy
seemingly allowed them todo just that. The acceptance ofMoore'smoral philosophy
was ameans of reconceiving the nonmoral reasons provided by their desires as moral
reasons with the requisite authority. So doing seemingly allowed the Bloomsbury
group to justify their form of life to their Victorian critics. Far from being at odds
with morality, the privileging of the aesthetic and the amorous was precisely what
morality requiredat least from the perspective of the Moorean ction that they
accepted. However, insofar as these amorous and aesthetic ends provided reasons
for acting in a given circumstance, what reason they actually provided lacked the
authority of morality. Apparent instances of nonnatural goodness were merely
shadows cast by amorous and aesthetic ends held independently of morality.
Of course, things with us needn't be as they were with the Bloomsbury group (or
at least as they are represented by MacIntyre and Keynes). There is a distinguished
philosophical tradition of regarding moral judgment as a noncognitive attitude.
Their may be nothing disreputable about this. However, if the grounds for regarding
moral judgment as noncognitive is our moral intransigence, then there's reason to
regard this as a real form of moral debility.
An interpretation of Kant's Formula of Humanity:
So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or that of
another, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. (g
4:429; 4:436)
makes vivid the problem. Consider again Putnam's reaction to fundamental dis
agreement. What Putnam holds in something akin to contempt is Nozick's moral
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sensibilitya moral sensibility that privileges property rights over what Putnam
regards as the compassionate treatment of the less well o. The question is whether
something akin to contempt is the right attitude to adopt towards someone who
in your view is lacking `in a certain kind of sensitivity and perception'. Even if
someone were lacking in this way, to treat him as an end is to treat him as capable,
at least in principle, of acquiring the requisite sensitivity and perception. Moreover,
to treat someone as an end is to allow for the possibility, however remote, that you
yourself are lacking in this way. The diculty of course is that contemptuousness is
inconsistent with both these attitudes.
Treating someone as an end involves oering them reasons and treating them as
capable of assessing those reasons. Conversely, it is to treat the reasons they oer as
potentially genuine reasons that they are in a position to assess. It is this latter aspect
of the Formula of Humanity that is presently relevant. What would it be, in the
context of a disagreement about reasons, for Edgar to treat the reasons that Bernice
oers as potentially genuine reasons that she is in a position to assess? It would
involve, at a minimum, an openness to reective doubt about his own grounds for
the permissibility of abortion. This in conjunction with an interest in accepting on
behalf of others a claim about the moral status of abortion is sucient to motivate
further inquiry into the grounds of moral acceptance. Edgar would have a motive to
inquire further into the grounds of moral acceptance to determine whether, in light
of his discussion with Bernice, his reasons for acceptance are good reasons. Edgar
would also have a motive to inquire further to determine, in light of his discussion
with Bernice, what, if anything, there is to Bernice's reasons for rejection. Bernice,
after all, might be onto something that so far eludes Edgar. Adopting the end of
further inquiry is not only to strive to be responsive to what reasons there are, but
to treat Bernice as an end and not merely as a means.
Of course, there is latitude in the fulllment of this end. Further inquiry is one
end among many and a person's ends must be rationally orderedperhaps Edgar
has more compelling immediate concerns. Particular actions taken to fulll this
end are epistemically meritorious while particular failures to fulll this end merely
lack epistemic merit and are not in any way epistemically blameworthy. There is
an additional reason why adopting the end of further inquiry should display this
normative structure. In this context, striving to be responsive to what reasons there
are is to strive for moral perfection, to better respond to authoritative reasons.
So, not only are actions taken to fulll this end epistemically meritorious but such
actions are morally meritorious as well. Similarly, not only do particular failures to
fulll this end lack epistemicmerit, such failures lackmoral merit as well. Moreover,
just as particular failures are not epistemically blameworthy, such failures are not
morally blameworthy. It is not surprising, then, that striving to be responsive to
what reasons there are should display this normative structure, a normative structure
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plausibly assigned to perfectionist duties.
Edgar, of course, need not revise his moral opinion. Treating Bernice as an end
need not involve Edgar abandoning the claim that abortion is morally permissible
only that he be prepared to bracket his full acceptance of that claim when inquir
ing further. Nor need it involve a partial normative accommodation of Bernice's
positionperhaps on due reection Bernice's position on abortion has nothing to
recommend. What it does require is that Edgar adopt the end of further inquiry. In
this context, striving to be responsive to what reasons there are is a manifestation of
moral virtue. The requirements of morality and the requirements of what it takes
to believe them here, at least, coalesce.
 5 Conclusion
Let's return, again, to the case formoral intransigence. You can be forgiven if you are
unmoved by the thoughtexperiment I oered you. Moral science ction may not
be possible, but you may still doubt whether the thoughtexperiment established
that moral acceptance is in fact intransigent. To be honest, all I care about is
whether you are persuaded by the conditional claimthat if moral acceptance is
intransigent, then it is noncognitive. For, if, in addition, you are persuaded that
noncomplacency is a cognitive and moral virtue, you will have good reason not to
be intransigent in your dealings with others, even with those who disagree about
fundamental matters of morals.
As I said, I am a philosopher, not a sociologist. Alarmed by the growing intran
sigence of public moral discussion, I undertook to describe in Moral Fictionalism
what moral practice would become if such intransigence became entrenched in the
norms governing public moral discourse. Moral Fictionalism, then, is a dystopian
metaphysics, a metaphysical parable about the debilitating eects of moral intran
sigence. It is an account of what moral practice would become if we lack sucient
respect to try to understand one another. Our moral judgments would be a self
portrait of our partial concerns, the expression of our emotional attitudeswhat
Kant calls empirical motives. And as Kant long ago warned: `human reason it its
weariness gladly rests on this pillow and in a dream of sweet illusions (which allow
it to embrace a cloud instead of Juno) it substitutes for a morality a bastard patched
up from limbs of quite diverse ancestry, which looks like whatever one wants to see
in it but not like virtue for him who has seen virtue in her true form'.
Thanks very much.
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